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This paper makes an attempt  to distinguish between financial structures
and monetary policies that have the potential to amplify real disturbances,
and thereby to lead to crises par excellence, and those where fluctuations
have risk sharing features, and do not aggravate real shocks. After
outlining the features of financial architectures that are most probably
responsible for the distinction, I evaluate  transition economies, by
judging their vulnerability from this perspective, and by offering future
policies suggestions for  acquiring a financial structure of the second
type. My conclusions advocate bold liberalisation with a view towards





Financial stability and liberalisation (integration) have become pet
subjects in the last decade. The concurrent reappearance of global
financial markets and of a number of financial crisis episodes with a clear
international dimension prompted both policy makers and academics to
consider and reconsider the subject several times. For those Transition
Economies in Eastern Europe (hereinafter referred to as TEs ) whose
clear political goal is to join the European Union the issue is obviously
topical and  recent global experience may contain manifold lessons for
them to learn. Many of these countries belong to that middle income
group frequently called emerging markets, where the 1990s saw a number
of regional, globalising crises, erupting sometimes quite unexpectedly,
and causing great harm. On the other hand the envisaged accession to the
European Union involves  problems specific to this very unification
process, which might have been instrumental in the ERM crises of 1992-
93. 
In this essay I start from the observation that not all financial crises seem
to be equally destructive. I hypothesise that the main responsibility of a
financial architecture is to avoid destructive crises, since even large
turbulences can be regarded as inevitable phenomena whose apparent
dampening may actually be socially damaging. Section 2  elaborates on
this idea. In the following two sections I will look at the problem with a
view to  identifying harmful financial crises. Section 3 focuses on the
financial structure, and Section 4 tries to sort out the role of monetary
policy. Section 5 analyses TEs’ experience with financial crises, in
addition to making guesses about what direction they are heading
towards, whereas  Section 6 considers monetary policy choices. Finally,
Section 7 comments on desirable policy actions.    
2 Distinguishing between crises
It is usually believed that financial crises are harmful per se, because they
cause great pain to societies.  Also, financial crises and vulnerability to
crises are deplored  because they prevent monetary policy from
efficiently managing inflation, either because a crisis makes it impossible,
6or because vulnerability to crises softens the determination of policy
makers. In addition to these general issues, if crises occur in the near
future, TEs may suffer, both because of a delay in accession as such, and
after accession, because of the prolongation of the period before
monetary unification. Moreover, it is thought that financial liberalisation
and integration in themselves increase the likelihood of crises. As TEs do
not have very well-developed financial infrastructures this makes them
especially vulnerable to crises since the accession process necessitates
total capital account liberalisation, and also because accession exposes
their domestic financial sectors to outside competition. The conclusion is
a dilemma: their financial sectors must be improved and stabilised before
accession, though liberalisation is a dangerous process, where caution is
absolutely necessary. 
One may say that the only perfectly safe financial system is no financial
system at all. Our understanding of financial intermediation suggests that
there does not exist any without risks, be it based on banks or securities
markets. Even complete securities markets would not necessarily put an
end to fluctuations,  and although intermediaries may improve the
allocation of risks and resources if “open” markets are incomplete, they
could not obtain a first best allocation.
Can we imagine a world where there are no financial troubles, but there
still exist recessions and other types of real disturbances? Indeed, one of
the main functions of the financial sector is to provide insurance against
risks. However if risks are real and cannot be done away with by fiat,
then is it not reasonable to assume that somebody must suffer sometimes,
and that financial sector problems may indeed be part of the scheme of
distributing risks (near) optimally? In this view crises help to give a state-
dependent character to allocations, which is indispensable for efficient
risk sharing when nondiversifiable risks exist.2 This idea cannot be
construed to imply that all banking, debt, asset market or exchange rate
crises are optimal, i.e. contingent outcomes constituting part of a first best
social distribution. This only means that they may have a useful function,
and that the crises we dislike must be those that aggravate the natural
risks of human (economic) life, or those that worsen rather than improve
risk sharing in society. The real problem is not that financial crises occur,
but that they may hit with an extraordinary force those who are most
vulnerable. Apparently such crises do exist. As many recent crisis
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7episodes seemed to possess this unpleasant feature to a large degree, they
seemed to provide a good pretext for denouncing liberalisation. However,
we may find recent examples where the financial crisis did not seem to
involve much “real” trouble. Then the question is not how to reduce
vulnerability to crises in general,  but rather how to create a financial
architecture where possible financial disturbances  belong to a risk-
sharing arrangement, and may help share real exogenous risks.     
Can we give an approximate definition of a “bad” financial crisis? 1. Real
shocks are amplified in a “bad” crisis. 2. A “bad” crisis may be caused by
shocks having nothing to do with fundamentals. 3. In a “bad” crisis losses
are not shared, the poor suffer relatively more than the rich. It must be
clear that the whole financial architecture, including markets,
intermediaries, monetary policies, is responsible for the quality of
financial crises, and that interaction between the components is crucial.
To illustrate the possibility of distinguishing between “acceptable” and
bad crises I am going to consider some financial crises from the 1990s.
What was the character of the 1992-1993 ERM crisis? For several
countries (notably Italy and  the United Kingdom)  the general opinion
was that the crisis did not bring any harm, rather the reverse. Apparently
the crisis had neither real nor inflationary adverse effects. In fact the
devaluations may have contributed in some cases to the recovery.  In
other words one can interpret the adjustable and vulnerable ERM as a sort
of optimal arrangement where real disturbances (the German unification
in the specific case) might have concluded in a financial crisis, which
was, however, part of a state-dependent implicit arrangement.3 
In contrast, what happened in Mexico may be construed as a harmful
crisis. Mexicans suffered acutely for years after the crisis, while US
investors were proudly reported by their government not to have lost any
money. This was probably one of the most invidious developments of all
famous crises in the 1990s. It is telling that after the Asian crises many
banks hastened to publish losses which just served them right. Yet, the
Asian crises themselves could not be viewed as optimal arrangements. As
is well known, several East Asian economies went into severe and
prolonged recessions, with unjust distributional consequences. It would
be very difficult to assign these to existing real shocks that may have
preceded the crises. Also, the financial sectors and monetary policies of
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8both Mexico and East Asian countries exhibited some of those mistakes I
am going to analyse in the following sections. 
3 Vulnerability and the financial architecture
The literature gives a number of clues on how to identify those features of
financial systems which could be blamed for the amplification of real
disturbances.  It appears to me that the presence of moral hazard, the
large fluctuations in asset prices,  the existence of financial market
linkages and the lack of hedging possibilities, are the most usual suspects. 
Moral hazard is generally regarded as one of the main reasons why a
financial accelerator exists. Moral hazard has natural (exogenous) causes,
but policies and institutions can aggravate the situation. (See
Eichengreen-Hausman [1999].) Explicit and implicit government
guarantees, as well as exchange rate pegging, have been identified as
harmful mechanisms resulting in more moral hazard.  Large asset price
volatility and bubbles have characterised many recently liberalised
financial markets and banking systems. However, poor quality of
supervision, weak regulatory frameworks and inexperience could be
usually noticed as lying at the root of these problems. Financial market
linkages have been found to be  powerful mechanisms in transmitting
disturbances internationally.4 On the other hand, the work of Allen and
Gale [1998b] suggests that restricted liberalisation may have played a
significant role here, and full international integration can be conducive
to less exposure to international spillovers. The lack of hedging
opportunities ([Eichengreen-Hausman [1999]) implies that international
investors find their investments in emerging markets too risky, and
develop such strategies to alleviate this problem that increase the
vulnerabilities of the countries involved. These strategies involve, for
instance, lending in foreign currency and at short term. Financial market
liberalisation and allowing the entry of foreign firms into domestic
financial markets can help to solve these problems as well, while
monetary unification can be an even more stable remedy.  
The above elements played important roles in the Latin American and
Asian crises in the 1990s. Moral hazard via implicit guarantees was a
well-documented feature of many Asian economies, and regulation was
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9far less than perfect, resulting in asset price bubbles in Thailand, for
instance. Several Latin American countries, suffering from the Tequila
effect, may have had less than perfect currency hedging possibilities.
Also, domestic financial markets were usually less than fully integrated,
and had rather huge government and domestic participation.  
From the above it seems that incomplete liberalisation and restricting
foreign entry into domestic financial markets, accompanied by weak
supervision,  and not liberalisation and integration per se, are the things
that cause harmful financial disturbances.  One may object that full
liberalisation will in fact increase the potential for foreigners to engage in
destabilising speculation in the foreign exchange market. My argument is
that there is no reason to believe that foreigners would probably use the
access to lending and borrowing in the “domestic” currency for hedging
purposes, whereas otherwise they would have to behave in ways (e.g.
short-term foreign currency lending) which are probably more
dangerous. Appetite for speculative profits can grow if monetary policies
are inappropriate (see next section), but this can be avoided.  On the other
hand, having foreign lenders expose themselves to genuine exchange rate
risk (i.e. risk that comes form real sources) provides an important risk
sharing possibility. Foreigners willing to lend in forints will share the
losses when things turn sour for Hungary, and the forint depreciates.
Another possible objection is that too much internationalisation may keep
the financial sectors of TEs underdeveloped. What are the main
arguments for the judgement that the financial sectors in TEs are
relatively inefficient? There seem to exist a number of comparable
indicators pointing to this inefficiency. They include measures of
financial depth, the share of GDP created by the banking sector, interest
rate spreads,  market capitalisation,  etc. However, one should refrain
from a hasty interpretation of these indicators.
First, financial depth and the overall size and liquidity of asset markets
may be closely related. As quite a huge part of money demand comes
from financial transactions demand, small financial markets may in
themselves reduce money demand. Second, there may be important
offshore markets that take up a large part of financial business for several
TE currencies.  Third, these countries are usually open, but their foreign
trade is not invoiced in their own currency, thereby decreasing money
demand. Fourth, some countries have an increasing share of
multinationals, or other group of firms that conduct quite a lot of business
internally, also implying that their activity requires little “domestic”
money. Fifth, the leverage of the multinational sector can appear to be too
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low, despite the fact that  parent enterprises can be highly levered. Thus
there must be quite a deal of financial intermediation occurring in foreign
markets, which results in investment in the country in question. Sixth,
foreign banks make direct lending to domestic enterprises to a certain
degree. 
To sum up, there are several factors suggesting that the usual indicators
do not indicate correctly how easy the access of enterprises to the services
of financial intermediaries is, as these financial services have already
been integrated into world markets.  Domestic interest rate spreads may
reflect a worse mixture of borrowers than what actually gets credit in the
economy. Of course, the indicators also show the consequences of
“primeval sins”  (domestic money is not used in transactions involving
foreigners), and/or those  of size effects. Having said that it remains true
that financial development is not very high in TEs, especially with regard
to the household sector. Here there must remain scope for financial sector
problems, for instance in the case of a real estate price bubble. However,
one can again trust learning capabilities. Even without any specific
regulatory effort, too much risk taking may be avoided by the financial
institutions themselves, having learnt from the mistakes of the past
decade. One can have a sober view of  the rationality of the market, but
one  can be confident that recurrent events may make an impact even
without the assistance of government  intervention.
4 Monetary (exchange rate) policy and financial stability
There has been a style of monetary policies pursued by central banks in
emerging economies with a view towards disinflation that might have had
unwelcome effects on financial stability. This strategy involved a heavily
managed (almost or practically pegged) exchange rate, coupled with
sterilisation, which tried to give a not insignificant positive excess yield
(premium) on the home currency. Formally
)( * dsii 
is the premium on the home currency when i is the home interest rate, i*
the foreign rate and  ds the rate of future devaluation of the home
currency. 
This policy implies that while times are “tranquil” the excess yield has a
significantly positive mean, and a relatively small variance. However,
there is also some probability that due to a surprise depreciation the 
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mean of the excess yield in the whole regime becomes closer to zero, and
its distribution has a larger variance and also possesses features of
nonnormality, such as excess kurtosis and non-zero skewness. Table 1
illustrates this traditional peg cum sterilisation regime for four countries
that practiced it, and suffered an exchange rate crisis. 
Table 1/1














(1) pr 0.1104 0.04 0.052 0.0336
(2) var 0.0016 0.0018 0.006 0.0008
(3)ske -.563 0.3038 -.7545 -.1443
(4)kurt 0.5311 -.0851 1.5191 2.1837
(5)rrate 0.05 0.0395 0.0822 0.0377
(6)cor 0.73 0.64 0.3 0.24
(7) 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.99
Table 1/2
Measures of monetary policies in the peg cum sterilisation regime













(1) pr 0.064 -.0036 -.0301 -.0085
(2) var 0.0172 0.0537 0.2322 0.0534
(3)ske -3.063 -5.375 -5.97 -5.961
(4)kurt 11.175 31.183 36.817 38.289
(5)rrate 0.054 0.0381 0.08 0.0377
(6)cor 0.28 -0.03 -0.32 -0.23
(7) 0.99 0.97 0.98 0.99
(ME: Mexico, KO: Korea, TH: Thailand, IN: Indonesia. pr: the average
premium on the USD, var: the empirical variance of the premium, ske:
the empirical skewness of the premium, kurt: the empirical kurtosis of the
premium, rrate: the 3-month real interest rate on the domestic currency,
: the weight on the domestic currency versus the USD (see below))
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The (adjustable) peg cum sterilisation policy based disinflation mainly on
the  exchange rate anchor, but, as it were, with no full confidence. The
lack of total confidence explained sterilisation and the resulting positive
average yield differential, which was thought to be helpful in defending
the peg. Also this strategy was believed to be disinflationary, via giving
respectably high real interest rates. (See Row (5) in Table 1.) In this
framework there was a very likely gain for everyone willing to invest in
the country’s currency, or alternatively to borrow in foreign currency. It
is common knowledge that one type of gambler prefers exactly this sort
of gamble, tending to neglect small probability events. This gambler is
satisfied with even small gains, and may forget that there might occur a
large loss when the small probability (unfavourable) outcome is realised.
It is widely believed that this policy aggravated the East Asian crises
when they came. The mechanism is as follows: there is  an implicit, but
unsure, guarantee by the government that it will not devalue, while it
keeps the nominal interest rate above the foreign rates.5 The interest rate
differential is high enough for many firms or banks to prefer borrowing in
foreign currency, which results in a currency mismatch making the
situation very delicate when adverse shocks occur.
 
Table 2













(1) pr 0.10 -.04 0.0137 0.3368
(2) var 0.0410 0.0556 0.0172 0.6707
(3)ske -.379 0.8011 -.4024 1.1316
(4)kurt 1.1815 0.1909 1.1782 0.5819
(5)rrate 0.076 0.0394 0.0269 0.1939
(6)cor -0.53 -0.41 0.08 0.06
(7) 0.94 0.86 0.98 0.8
(The beginning months in this table were chosen so as to exclude the
most turbulent periods.)
The apparent failures of these policies have led to two directions. One
direction has led to stronger rigidity via a currency board arrangement,
and the other one, recently very popular, involves floating exchange rates.
Table 2 shows the corresponding statistics for the four countries in their
post-crisis “flexible” regimes. One can see that the practice of flexibility
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is more diverse than that of pegging. Premia are large and positive in
some countries, while negative in others. The mean is probably not so
meaningful a statistic in this regime as in all cases variances have
increased rather substantially. Real interest rates are again positive but
with large differences across countries. Another observation about the
shift of regimes is that the correlation between real returns changed from
positive into negative or became small as a result of floating, due
probably to the weakened exchange rate pass-through. 
It may be too early to assess the performance of the new regimes, or even
to find out what characterises them precisely. From the point of view of
engendering financial vulnerability one may have suspicions. The
countries with large average excess yields (see Table 2) may increase
their vulnerability as this may attract speculation in a floating regime, too,
by (nearly risk neutral) foreigners, or can result in desperado behaviour
by residents. On the other hand Calvo-Reinhart [2000] shows that many
“nominal” floaters practise exchange rate management, though, in some
cases, not so much via direct exchange market intervention, but rather
with the help of nominal interest rates. This in itself may cause
disturbances in the financial system.
I would like to add another possible reason why the new regimes can in
the end prove to be also apt to suffer from serious financial turbulences.
So far I have used the term “real interest rate” in the usual sense, as the
relative price of domestic consumption today in terms of tomorrow’s
consumption, when the calculation is based on the domestic currency
interest rate. Is it not an atavism of closed economy macroeconomics to
think of the domestic interest rate as “the” interest rate? Adding the
Keynesian presumption of predetermined prices this leads to the
identification of nominal and real interest rates that residents must
presumably face when making saving-investment decisions. However, it
could  be more plausible to think of the real return as a distribution that is
available for those investing in domestic bonds, or in foreign bonds, or in
any other securities. In fact, the sure real interest rate simply does not
exist in any economy. 
Although there may be several assets in the menu, let us confine our
attention to two default risk free bonds, one denominated in the home and
the other in a foreign currency.  With substantial liberalisation of capital
flows, a domestic investor may form a portfolio that is more or less close
to a real asset with a yield almost not contingent on the state. More
14







are the respective real returns on home and foreign currency bonds. (Here
dp is inflation.)
The optimal solution may imply that one of the weights ( or 1-) is












Then we can take the expected yield on this portfolio as the approximate
real rate of interest, while the  weight also provides us with information
about monetary policy. One, perhaps surprising, lesson from Table 1 is
that the domestic currency real interest rate is practically the same as the
average real return on the minimum variance portfolio (see Row (7) with
the large s). The reason for this is obviously the large variance of
foreign currency real interest rates. On the other hand one can observe a
decrease in  in all cases, and in the cases of Thailand and Indonesia a
rather significant one. This might suggest that the increased volatility of
domestic currency real interst rates may give an impetus to risk averse
agents to rely more on foreign currency denominated instruments than in
the previous regime. If the peg cum sterilisation regime foundered on risk
lovers, who neglected low probability events, the new regime can prompt
both  conservative and speculative agents to turn away from the domestic
currency, undermining thereby its stability.6
                                                          
6 One must notice that the high kurtosis in the distributions of excess returns observable in Table1/2
might have led to the distrust in the domestic currency by conservative agents, too, since variance is not
the approporiate measure for risk in the case of non-normal distributions.. 
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5 Past and future crises in TEs7
There are a number of TEs that have suffered from some kind of financial
crisis in the last decade. In Russia, virtually all types of crises appeared
simultaneously in 1998. There was first a stock market crisis with
significant real repercussions, then a sharp devaluation with foreign
(including private) debt moratorium, and with bank runs resulting in a
collapse of the payments system.  After years of currency instability and
banking sector problems, in 1997 Bulgaria saw a currency attack happen,
resulting in a full-blown banking crisis with runs. Default was avoided,
and there was no stock market crisis, there being  no stock market to
speak of. In Romania a permanent state of banking and currency
problems has prevailed. In 1997-98, the foreign exchange situation
exhibited the features of a crisis with large depreciation, though no bank
runs and no collapse of financial intermediation  ensued. The Slovak
Republic was able to defend its fixed exchange rate system despite an
attack during the Czech crisis of 1997. However, the Russian crisis of
1998 triggered the collapse of the fixed exchange rate system, leading  to
a large depreciation of the Slovak koruna. 
In all of these cases, it appears that there were fundamental problems
also ending in financial crises, in the, sometimes, rather simple financial
systems. The root of the problems was patently fiscal, though for the
Slovak Republic, this statement is not easy to prove by reference to
traditional fiscal accounts. Despite the fact that the financial systems were
obviously not robust or efficient in these countries, the financial crises
were definitely adjunct to the very real troubles that plagued these
economies. There seems to be no evidence that the financial sphere made
things definitely worse. On the other hand it is possible that Bulgaria and
the Slovak Republic were stimulated by their respective financial crises,
and the reform processes gained  momentum in their wake. In fact, it is
possibly true for the other two countries as well. 
The three Baltic countries (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) have had quite
different experience. They all  have rigid exchange rate regimes (currency
boards in Lithuania and in Estonia, and a strict peg in Latvia), they have
liberalised their financial sectors rather boldly, but they have been more
exposed to Russian trade than most other TEs. The Russian crisis had
quite a severe impact on Latvia, due to the economy’s high exposure to
                                                          
7 This section is, to a large extent, based on Árvai-Vincze [2001].
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Russian markets, but the exchange rate regime did not have to be
abandoned. Even though we cannot speak of a full-blown banking crisis,
several banks experienced bank runs and liquidity crises following the
Russian crisis. There was a modest rise in interest rates, though capital
flight was not substantial as foreign participation in Latvia’s capital
markets is insignificant. Stock prices had been declining for several
months already before  the crisis; thus, there was no significant
immediate effect on the stock market. Although Lithuania was also quite
vulnerable to contagion from Russia, the currency board arrangement
survived the storm and the consequences of the Russian crisis were more
substantial in the real economy than in the financial markets. Financial
markets basically reacted the same way as in Latvia. Estonia was  a
similar case to the other two Baltic economies, though with less
damaging consequences to the real economy, due to its lower exposure to
Russia. Nevertheless the stock market was hard hit by foreign investors’
loss of confidence. As an automatic response to the liquidity shortage in a
currency board system, there was an immediate rise in interest rates, but
capital flight was not substantial. 
The three Baltic states represent an interesting experiment inasmuch as
liberalisation was coupled with very rigid exchange rate policies. These
countries managed to get over the Russian crisis and its aftermath in a
relatively intact state, proving that this mix of policies can be efficient in
avoiding bigger troubles. The Russian crisis was definitely “real” for
these economies, and almost necessarily their financial sectors were not
as robust as possible. Still there were  relatively few disturbances, like
those in Latvia, that might have been  an indication of a “bad” crisis.
Indeed, one may say that these countries were definitely vulnerable to
economic crises for real reasons. In this light one can evaluate the whole
story of the Baltic states as fundamentally a success story. An alternative
interpretation would be to attribute the troubles after the Russian crisis as
a consequence of the inflexible exchange rate arrangement. Although this
interpretation is not nonsensical, the burden of proof must rest with  its
advocates. 
In May 1997, the Czech Republic was the target of speculative attacks
which the monetary authorities were not able to withstand and the fixed
exchange rate system had to be given up. The repercussions of the
currency crisis in the capital market were less severe than expected.
Though the currency crisis did not lead to a liquidity crisis in the banking
system, the serious problems of the Czech banking sector, which have
been accumulating for years,  became more visible. I claim that the Czech
crisis was  not a bad crisis either, as it inflicted little pain on the economy,
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at least no additional pain with respect to what should have followed in
any case because of the real sources of the crisis. This was despite the
fact that at the time the Czech economy did not exhibit all the good
features I recommended in Section 2, and that previous exchange rate
policies had belonged to the adjustable peg cum sterilisation category.
My view is that the Czech policy regime exhibited the features of an
implicit risk sharing arrangement. It was based on a risky strategy of fast
disinflation and quick resumption of growth in an ownership framework
where the government’s influence was strong via its possession of the
banking system. As things turned out unfavourably, the implied exchange
rate regime was able to implement cost sharing  via the devaluation that
put some of the burden on the shoulders of non-residents investing in
koruna denominated assets. The crisis again worked like a catalyst,
leading  to a policy that after some years seems to be producing positive
results. Today the Czech banking sector is in a much better shape and, to
a large extent, in foreign ownership. Though the crisis caused the
abandonment of  the exchange rate based disinflation strategy, the current
monetary policy is reasonable in that it avoids unnecessarily giving too
good investment opportunities, and provides a fundamentally stable
nominal exchange rate. 
Poland’s monetary authorities had widened the fluctuation band in
several steps before  finally letting the zloty float in April 2000. This
move may have been influenced by the consideration of the desire for an
“independent” monetary policy, and also taken with a view towards pre-
empting potential speculative attacks. The Russian crisis had some
adverse impacts on exchange rates and asset prices, but Poland may have
had some real exposure to Russia, and   contagion  may also have been a
factor at work. Still, there is little evidence that the post-Russian-crisis
disturbances were really serious. Poland has put great weight  on
disinflation,  surrendering monetary policy to that goal. (However, in
order to cushion the impacts of the Russian crisis, some easing was
forthcoming at the end of 1998.) Poland is a candidate where the adverse
effects of a disinflationary strategy based on the interest rate channel
might have been instrumental. The mini crisis at the beginning of 2000
may have been caused by the anti-inflationary zeal resulting in very high
zloty real interest rates and in high premia. 
In Hungary, banking problems had been  solved via consolidation before
1995, though its cost may have contributed to the recurrent small attacks
on the currency through 1994-95.  The currency problem was managed
via a larger devaluation and the implementation of a stabilisation
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program. In 1998, after the Russian crisis, stock prices dropped sharply,
but without important real effects. The exchange rate came under some
pressure, but was defended almost costlessly. 
Slovenia is a case of avoiding all sorts of crises at the cost of maintaining
relatively strong capital controls, and pursuing extremely cautious
macroeconomic policies. It has suffered from no crisis, but it has also
seen relatively little liberalisation. This mixture of policies was admitted
by good initial conditions, but Slovenia is apparently situated on a
dangerous middle ground now, which may be a portent of future troubles,
unless a bolder reform of the financial sector materialises. 
6 Monetary and exchange rate policies in TEs
So far TEs have produced a wide variety of exchange rates and monetary
policy regimes. Let us see a few statistics about Hungary, the Czech
Republic, Poland, and Estonia in different time periods. 
Table 3/1
















(1) pr 0.0658 0.048 0.0764 0.0624 0.1111
(2) var 0.0077 0.0125 0.018 0.0241 0.0366
(3)ske 0.2708 -.669 -.878 -.954 -.758
(4)kurt 0.0077 1.226 1.327 1.261 0.5319
(5)rrate 0.0197 0.0197 0.058 0.0326 0.0831
(6)cor 0.03 0.09 0.32 0.45 0.42
(7) 0.79 0.88 0.97 0.98 1.04
Table 3/2



















(1) pr 0.0052 0.0258 0.0914 0.075 -.019 -.039
(2) var 0.0003 0.0019 0.0045 0.0074 0.0113 0.0188
(3)ske -1.33 1.249 -.431 -.785 -.749 -.7435
(4)kurt 8.133 1.306 -.700 1.76 0.513 0.2431
(5)rrate -0.172 -0.11 0.0468 0.0495
(6)cor 0.99 0.97 0.84 0.77 0.24 -0.02
(7) 0.42 -0.53 1.32 1.26 0.77 0.79
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(CZ:Czech Republic, PL: Poland, HU: Hungary, ES: Estonia  (In Table 3 the
premium, correlation and  rows refer to the Deutsche Mark, except in Columns (5)
and (6) of Table 3/2 where they refer the US Dollar.)
The Czech Republic followed a peg cum sterilisation style policy before
its own crisis of May 1997.  Columns (1) and (2) in Table 3/1 illustrates
this, though the changes between the columns are not so sharp as those
between Tables 1/1 and 1/2, as the Czech crisis was a relatively mild
affair compared to those of East Asia and Mexico. In 1997 Czech
monetary policy switched to a floating regime, and Column (3) exhibits
some of the more general features of floating regimes found in Table 2. 
From 1993 on, Poland increased its exchange rate flexibility gradually,
starting from a traditional crawling peg, then widening the bandwidth
until abolishing it. Splitting the sample into two shows what it has meant.
There was an increase across subsamples in both the premium and  the
real interest rate, and there was an increased variance in the premium
accompanied with somewhat more “normal” higher order moments. 
After its mini exchange rate crisis in 1995, Hungary moved from an
adjustable peg regime to a crawling band with a +-2.25 bandwidth,
sticking to it until April 2001. Since the band was most of the time
defined for a basket of DM and USD I report statistics for both
currencies. Colunm (3) and (5) in Table 3/2 show the statistics for the
subsample before the Russian crisis, and Column (4) and (6) for the
whole period. (Column (3) and (4)  refer to DM statistics.) One can
observe here again the features of the peg cum sterilisation regimes, but
without a proper crisis. The s reflect the existence of the basket, and
also the fact that DM real interest rates had a much higher correlation
with forint real rates, due probably to a close relationship between
DM/forint exchange rates and Hungarian inflation. The large difference
between the premia is attributable to DM/dollar exchange rate changes. 
Estonia has been a devoted currency boarder, fixing its krona against the
DM from quite early on during transition. Columns (1) and (2) in Table
3/2 show the small premia in tranquil times, and the somewhat increased
premia if we include the turbulent periods of the Asian and Russian
crises. Nonnormality appears even in normal times, but the obvious
difference between this and the peg cum sterilisation strategy is the size
of the premium. Note the large negative average real interest rates.
From the above tables it seems that all countries, except Estonia, had
significantly positive real interest rates. One may pose the question
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whether these were important for inflationary developments.  Figure 2
would suggest that this was not so much the case.  Estonia had the most
spectacular disinflation of the five countries whose inflation rates are
displayed, and it has recently been a forerunner in the inflation front,
together with the Czech Republic. 
Figure 1
Indeed Table 4 can be invoked to give a different explanation for
differential inflation developments in the region. 
Table 4





Czech Republic 45       -2
Slovenia 65        26
Estonia 82        0
Poland 103 33
Hungary 135 85
The only change in rankings happen  between Estonia and Slovenia,
where Slovenia has the highest per capita GDP, and Estonia, a former

























Soviet republic, probably had the most distorted price system at the
beginning of transition. The above data suggest the following
interpretation. Real interest rates have probably played minor roles in
inflation developments. The style of monetary policy, or the exchange
rate regime was not really determining  inflation either in the short or in
the long term. Short-term movements in the rate of inflation were
probably due to common causes (oil prices, agricultural shocks), whereas
monetary policy mattered for lower frequency price changes, mostly via
its relationship with the nominal exchange rate. 
What about the relationship between these monetary policies and
financial vulnerability? Above we noted the role of peg cum sterilisation
policies in the Asiatic and Mexican crises. Again, we find  large premia
with small variances in the Czech Republic before 1997, which is  also
suspected to have played a role in the crisis. In fact Czech monetary
policy has recently moved towards much smaller premia (see Figure 2).
Polish premia became quite large in the second subperiod, while interest
rate volatility has probably been largest in Poland  (see Figure 2 again). In
fact Poland has been struggling with balance of payments problems in
recent years, and it is not impossible that beside fiscal policy its monetary
policy might have contributed to this.  Hungary’s crawling band system
seemed to work reasonably well from the point of view of financial
stability, as it had more built-in flexibility than pegs. This policy,
however, fared worse than most others in inflationary terms (see Figure
1).  On the other hand Estonia’s currency board, which performed quite
well in terms of inflation, was no safe haven against the turbulence of
international financial markets.   
Figure 2
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This broad menu of monetary policies might have important attraction to
investors when there are regional shocks. Providing different exchange
rate regimes is apparently tantamount to offering different assets where
asset yields have the same regional factor, and these different asset yields
react differently to the same source of uncertainty. In other words,
countries have provided investors with significant diversification
opportunities. This might have contributed to the popularity of the region.
Now, is this a stable arrangement and, if not, what would be the
consequences of changes thereof? 
Hungary’s recent switch to floating rates suggests, though not necessarily
implies, some convergence between exchange rate policy styles. If there
is a move towards uniformity, and it will almost necessarily happen if
several countries aim at fulfilling the Maastricht criteria simultaneously,
then this diversification possibility will pass and capital flows may
become either smaller or possibly more volatile. It is not unlikely that
uniform policies played important roles not only in the East Asian crises
but also in the ERM crisis. Taking this into account,  either some
sequencing of Monetary Union entry or the changing of the Maastricht
criteria might be of some help. As the latter would be very difficult to
change, the first solution appears to be more viable. However, it would
obviously also  trigger political tensions. So there is a definite sense in
which the two pre-euro years may become the most susceptible to capital
flow volatility and attacks. This means that it would be useful to do
everything possible to prepare for this.   
The recent worldwide move towards flexible exchange rates, and a strong
emphasis put on the interest rate channel of monetary policy has been
motivated by several ideas. One goal certainly was to diminish financial
vulnerability, and another involved a more successful management of
inflation. This latter goal can be decomposed into two. First, countries
wish to target low inflation on average, and secondly, they would like to
stabilise inflation. Both ideas are explicit in the Maastricht criteria, and
very strongly imbued in EU mentality. If we have reasons to doubt  both
the necessity of having very low inflation all the time and the desirability
of little inflation variability, then a fortiori we have a case against the
very active use of the interest rate or, which is the same thing, the interest
rate channel, in TEs. In the following, I proceed to develop an argument
to this effect.
There are good reasons to believe that the real exchange rate is going to
appreciate in the accession countries. Whether this is strictly related to the
so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, or can be explained by other causes
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is not important here. Indeed, there might be other factors behind the
increase in the relative price of services with respect to industrial goods.
One can invoke, for instance, improvements in the quality of services,
which would have the same impact on relative prices as  differential
productivity growth, except that the former would act from the demand
side of the economy. In addition, the former habits of pricing public
services would also imply that their relative prices will increase at a
relatively higher rate in TEs. The differences in pricing agricultural goods
are well-known, and their impact on relative prices can also be predicted
to result in real appreciation. This real appreciation on a CPI basis seems
to be unavoidable provided that TEs fulfil the hopes of faster
development and modernisation. Now the question is whether this will be
carried out via a positive inflation differential or nominal exchange rate
appreciation. Thus, in order to attain the EU average it is almost sure that,
aside from temporary manipulation, one would have to resort to nominal
appreciation.8 No one doubts nowadays the advantages of having a low
rate of inflation, lower than that prevailing in many TEs at the moment.
However, it is fair to say that a few percentage points higher inflation
than that achieved in Euroland is probably not so tragic. If appreciation
will require high average excess yields, then, though potentially helpful
against inflation, it may also increase vulnerability by attracting hot
money. With very robust financial systems and with very good prudential
regulation the problem may not be too serious. Nevertheless, it  is
questionablewhether all accession countries would pass this test on
account of the weaknesses of  their financial sectors.  This is an example
of the importance of interactions between monetary policies and financial
structures in determining  vulnerability.  
One might also argue that striving for very little inflation variability can
be counterproductive. It is clear that both long-run and short-run relative
price changes have occurred and will occur in TEs. It is a fair assumption
that these changes go on in markets (industries) having very different
characteristics concerning price flexibility. Some of them work like
auction markets, with very strong short-term demand and supply effects.
Others, like public services, are usually repriced once a year, while on
other markets certain indexing mechanisms may have developed,
especially in those countries where exchange rate changes were
predictable and stable. In any case, an active monetary policy implying
frequent and possibly large nominal changes would definitely cause
relative price variation and therefore allocational distortions. For instance,
there are very good reasons to believe that food prices are much more
                                                          
8 Nominal appreciation and the concomitant “weighing-in” problem are  analysed in Szapáry [2001]. 
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volatile in TEs than in developed economies. As the share of food prices
is also higher, this imparts an incipient volatility to the CPI as well.
Efforts to stabilise it may cause variations in relative prices that could be
totally nonsensical from a general welfare point of view. 
7 Summary and policy conclusions
In this essay I distinguished between “acceptable” and “bad” financial
crises, seeking to identify the features of  financial structures and
monetary policies that are most likely responsible for the distinction. The
analysis of financial crises in TEs has shown that although none of them
have  exhibited the properties that would make the avoidance of a bad
crisis very likely,  they haven’t had any “bad” financial crises in the sense
I use this term in this study. There are two possible explanations: either
this has happened by chance, or their financial infrastructure has been so
underdeveloped that it has not had the necessary strength to produce a
veritable bad financial crisis. As the countries under review  seem to be
intent on developing their financial sectors, they should remain or
become vulnerable to bad crises in the future. So what are the best ways
to escape from this predicament? 
A recurrent topic of Section 2 is that liberalisation and integration are the
only safe strategies in the long run. In the case of TEs there is one reason
why caution must not have an enormous weight in the immediate future.
The reason is that EU accession will in any case require virtually full
liberalisation, and there is some advantage to the idea of starting
experimentation with  a liberalised system before that date. One
important caveat is that the quality of prudential regulation must be
improved, as it  appears to be a necessary part of any modern financial
system. The biggest challenge is how to cope with asset price bubbles.  In
this respect,  recent regulatory experience must be incorporated into the
regulatory frameworks as fast as possible.  It must be noted, however,
that regulators can trust the learning capacity of the private sector. 
This leads to another major point: privatisation of the financial sector
must go ahead quickly, and if it is done fairly and without restrictions,
then almost necessarily it will involve a very high foreign ownership
share in all TEs. Indeed, in the last few years enormous progress has been
made  in this field even in those countries that used to lag behind with
respect to bank privatisation. Foreign banks’ participation is useful not
just because they have experience in general and in particular with  recent
financial turmoils, but also because this can ameliorate the moral hazard
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issue, which is potentially the most dangerous factor for financial
vulnerability.  
It appears to be a general lesson from the Asian crises that several of the
countries that suffered most from the concatenation of financial sector
and currency crises had had a domestic ownership oriented policy of
liberalisation. Now some of the TEs have not committed that mistake that
is one way leading to moral hazard via implicit guarantees. However, it
can be an important problem for Slovenia, which  appears  to have chosen
the cautious and protectionist approach so far,  that it can run into serious
difficulties at the time it would most need some respite. For every country
cleaning up the inevitable mess that must have accompanied the early
stages of transition must be an important prerequisite to successful  entry
into the Union.
The analysis of monetary (exchange rate) policies showed that the
relationship between these policies and financial vulnerability is very
complex. We have learnt of the dangers inherent in currency pegs, and
may have misgivings about actively independent policies in floating
regimes. I raised the question whether the goals of avoiding financial
instability and attaining low and stable inflation are fully consistent. 
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